Loomnie

Chinua Achebe, one of the greatest writers Nigeria has ever known, recently wrote an op-ed article titled Nigeria’s Promise, Africa’s Hope for the New York Times. The piece starts out with the injustices of colonisation and how Africans had no idea about what to do with independence after having gained it. The following two excellent sentences capture the point:

If you take someone who has not really been in charge of himself for 300 years and tell him, “O.K., you are now free,” he will not know where to begin.

and

We are like the man in the Igbo proverb who does not know where the rain began to beat him and so cannot say where he dried his body.

In his opinion, Europe, which implicated itself by colonising Africa and in the process messing things up, owe it as a duty to help Africans through the current predicaments.

In his conclusion he marshals the usual suspects: godfatherism has to end; the domination of politics by a few half-baked, half-educated leaders has to stop; there has to be a right balance of the power of the executive and the responsibility that comes with that power – in other words there should be a strong form of accountability; people should have more access to official information, and this can be ensured by the passing and signing of a strong freedom of information bill; and of course, we have to have a new patriotic consciousness.

Keith Hart, in the latest in a series of posts he is blogging as he writes a book on Africa, describes Achebe’s piece as an “old school nationalist history of the sort that misled Africans at the time of independence.” He continues:

Achebe’s vision of world history is narrow and backward-looking; the programme advocated, such as it is, takes no account of contemporary world society or of the forces within it that might support African emancipation at whatever level of association; he repeats the mistake of focusing exclusively on politics and law (“seek ye first the political kingdom”); and deals with the economic conditions of democracy only through their negation as excessive ill-begotten wealth. The thinking behind this piece, in other words, has not moved on since the mid-twentieth century.

His own recommendations, among other things [be sure to read the article in full] are:

Some of Africa’s political leaders and activist intellectuals must come to grips with what has been going on in the last century and is going on now. ‘Africa’ a century ago included the New World diaspora created by the slave trade; but it now includes a second diaspora created since 1945 by voluntary migration to Europe, America and increasingly Asia. At a time when India’s hi-tech entrepreneurs are returning home from Silicon Valley in droves, the question of African development must hinge on how this new expatriate population could take part in the continent’s growth. Above all, if Africans are to win some measure of equality for themselves in world society, they must ask how multiple forms of political association at more and less inclusive levels might help them to address the development question. There is little point in waiting for the West’s benevolent intervention.

Regional integration, even Panafricanism, has a better chance in this multi-polar, convergent world than it did half a century ago and that, for me, is where Africa’s hope lies.

I am inclined to agree with Keith Hart. In Achebe’s article, one could almost not find anything about the global power shift that has happened in the past few decades – and that continues to happen. It is almost as if he has a few points that he makes once someone asks him about what is happening in the continent and what can be done. Of course, there is hardly anything to disagree with in the list of things he would like to see happen. However, one leaves the article without feeling as if one has learnt anything new or thought-provoking.

What do you think?

FT’s Gideon Rachman thinks that the answer to that question might be Yes:

The backlash against immigration is particularly visible in Europe. In Britain, the new coalition government has promised to reduce the number of immigrants from hundreds of thousands a year to tens of thousands. International banks and multinational companies are already complaining that their businesses are being badly affected. Over the past year anti-immigration parties have made breakthroughs in the Netherlands and Sweden – and a book lambasting the cultural effects of immigration has become a huge bestseller in Germany. In the US, the populist Tea Party movement has increased the pressure to crack down on illegal immigration from Mexico.

The re-regulation of capital movements is also moving up the international agenda, amid talk of a “global currency war”. As all the world’s major powers seek to export their way out of economic trouble, so tensions have grown. America complains that China is deliberately undervaluing its currency to maintain a vast trade surplus that is contributing to US unemployment. The Chinese retort that the US is printing money in an effort to drive down the dollar. Questions about the future of the euro have raised the spectre that capital controls might one day have to be reimposed within Europe, as part of a managed effort to break up the single currency. On a more minor, but practical level, some emerging markets – most notably Brazil – imposed controls on inflows of “hot money” last year, to prevent their currencies being boosted to hopelessly uncompetitive levels. Since a new global compact on currencies is unlikely in 2011, this trend is likely to gather momentum.

I know of many countries that will argue that they weren’t really part of globalization anyway (at least in the sense that it is described above), and that the role they play – as sources of primary resources – will remain largely unchanged, even if there were to be a relative retreat of ‘globalization’.

See also Kenneth Rogoff’s take on the topic, as well as Joseph Stiglitz’s.

Ronald Coase, the economist who theorised the reason for the existence of firms, turns 100 today. The Economist’s Schumpeter column has this really nice piece about him:

His central insight was that firms exist because going to the market all the time can impose heavy transaction costs. You need to hire workers, negotiate prices and enforce contracts, to name but three time-consuming activities. A firm is essentially a device for creating long-term contracts when short-term contracts are too bothersome. But if markets are so inefficient, why don’t firms go on getting bigger for ever? Mr Coase also pointed out that these little planned societies impose transaction costs of their own, which tend to rise as they grow bigger. The proper balance between hierarchies and markets is constantly recalibrated by the forces of competition: entrepreneurs may choose to lower transaction costs by forming firms but giant firms eventually become sluggish and uncompetitive.

Of course, things are not that neat (read the rest of the article) but his central ideas in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) survive in the work of New Institutional Economists, with transaction cost remaining central to much of their theorising.

Chris Blattman draws attention to the myth of information technology in development. What interests me is why this particular myth (of ICT in development) still survives. Which leads me to wonder how many ideas in development research and practice are really myths that have simply refused to die; and why they have refused to die. Which in turn leads me to wonder how many ideas that are around today will be acknowledged as myths a few years from now. Or whether they would be acknowledged as myths at all.

The Economist has a nice article on immigration in Germany. If you can recall, Angela Merkel recently said that multiculturalism has utterly failed in Germany. This was following the furore that was raised by the publication of a book that claimed that immigrants and muslims were causing the downfall of Germany. The book was written by Thilo Sarazzin, a member of the board of the German Bundesbank. He was subsequently forced off the board of the Bundesbank. (See the Economist article for a recap of the main issues.)

What some of the people I have spoken with are scared of is that this might yet become a major political issue, leading, for instance to the creation of an acceptable right wing party. (There are the crazies, like NPD, the neo-Nazi party, but nobody really takes them seriously.) The fear is that if Ms Merkel is unable to contain the discussions surrounding immigration within her party, it is possible that some members might decide to go with the general sentiment of anti-immigration and form a political party that retains the basic economic policies of the right of centre CDU, but adds to it anti-immigration rhetorics and policies. A party like that, I am afraid, will be appealing to certain segments of the German middle-class.

Adewale Ajadi writes in NEXT:

Is it not possible that in a heated polity Mrs. Yar’Adua sees herself as isolated and her husband as threatened; viewing each delegation that approached Saudi Arabia with the same cynicism that is abroad across the land and drinking from the same sectional cesspool from which the national psyche is daily watered; she would watch life ebb out of her man, her insecurity and loyalty driving choices that are now the source of criticism? Is it possible that this is a wife fighting for her husband the best way she knows how?

In this aspect the restraint of the Acting President, which is seen in some quarters as slowness and even cowardice, takes the shape of wisdom and humanity, standards that are rarely ever prominent in our win-lose public life. It is possible to see the fingerprint of misogyny all over the glee of the attacks on Mrs. Yar’Adua.

I feel that this is a possible understanding of the situation Mrs Yar’Adua is in, and I said as much in a somewhat rambling post (forgive me, a combination of lack of sleep and too much coffee sometimes takes its toll).

And in relation to the constitionality of how the Acting President was appointed:

As things stand it will be difficult under the provisions of the current Constitution to justify the creative process with which the Senate fashioned an acting president, an action, which was not only laudable and in fact heroic in the context, but also not necessarily constitutional. It is a mark of the institutional progress that even though a president had been missing for three months, there was a process that kept the affairs of state grinding even if slowly. It stands to reason that what we need is a far less ambitious document.

That is also my stance. Indeed, it is a sign of institutional progress that the country has been able to muddle through a very difficult situation and come out of it with something that we all might not agree with, but that somehow works. It is also impressive that the country was run quite well all through the time that there was no president, something that made me write, cynically, that we probably do not need a president.

These are really impressive things that should be highlighted. Agreed, we need to have discussions on recent and ongoing happenings, but reducing things to sensationalism only distracts from the issues that really need focus. Sensationalism sells paper, but does it really serve the public?

See Akin’s blog for a similar take.

My saxophone instructor, a Muslim, asked me today about the ‘religious violence’ in northern Nigeria. I tried to explain to him that most of the violence that is reported from northern Nigeria is about a weird definition of who an indigene is and who a settler is, and that most often, the immediate cause of the violence is some fight over resources. In other words, people fight over access to resources (control of state power should be seen as a resource), but quickly resort to claims of entitlement based on ethnicity, place of origin and religion. These modes of identification are then often used to mobilise other people with the same or similar identity markers to fight opposing groups.

I was just thinking about this when I saw that Jeremy had written a post about it. He mentions poverty and an artificial distinction between ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ as being at the root of the conflict in Plateau State. In short, things are way more nuanced than they are often depicted in the media.

See for instance the details of a conflict that broke up in Langtang, close to Jos in 2002:

In June 2002, a serious conflict broke out in the Langtang area, some 200 km. SE of Jos, and was still current in May 2003. The main inhabitants of the region are the Tarok people, principally farmers, but the large open savannah between Langtang and the Benue river has long attracted nomadic Ful∫e graziers. There are also neighbouring smaller tribes such as the Boghom as well as substantial settlements of Hausa, notably at Wase (east of Tarokland towards the Benue) and the ferry-crossing at Ibi (southeast). The Tarok have maintained good relations with the Ful∫e for a long time and are now themselves substantial cattle owners, often as a result of sending their sons to be trained in herding by the Ful∫e. The Tarok are overwhelmingly Christian, although traditional religion also plays an important role in maintaining social order, whereas the Hausa and Ful∫e are strongly Muslim. The Tarok, moreover, have a long tradition of military service, and many of their leaders are ex-generals.

Apparently, a fight broke out in Yelwa, near Shendam (in SE Plateau State) at the end of June 2002 between Christian and Muslim residents, resulting in the burning of churches. Fleeing Tarok families brought the news to Langtang South, inciting attacks on Hausa-owned businesses in various settlements in the region. Prompt intervention of the security services brought about a temporary calm. However, it appears that a substantial number of Hausa and Fulani, armed with modern weapons and some at least from outside the region, regrouped and began attacking Tarok settlements from a base near Wase. Local people claim that mercenaries from Niger and Chad were involved although this is hard to verify. At this point, Tarok church leaders seem to have turned funds collected for evangelisation to the purchase of modern weapons. Traders appear to have had some guns in readiness for self-defence and were soon able to supply automatic weapons from Enugu. In general, government reaction seems generally to have been inaction, although there is a report of a pitched battle at Kadarko, near Ibi, where the Mobile Police were forced to retreat. Government-controlled media made no mention of the situation for some three weeks, when they reported (falsely) that things were back to normal. The lack of official action was so marked that one of the leaders of the Tarok, Rev. Maina, took the unusual action of placing newspaper adverts in the independent press pleading for a more effective response from government.

Since this date there has been open armed warfare between Tarok and Hausa /Ful∫e and the whole region is a no-go zone. Women and children have fled into refuges and well-organised groups regularly burn down villages in remote areas. Soldiers have been sent to key flashpoints such as Wase, but since they will not enter the bush and meet the armed groups on their own terms, this is a largely ineffective. A worrying consequence has been the uncharacteristic arming of small communities and the development of weapons workshops. Although a few hunters have always had Dane guns, their manufacture is now widespread and even herdboys now go to the fields armed. Peace summits between Jos-based leaders have had little or no impact. The elections in May 2003 distracted the political elite in Jos in the preceding months from paying attention to this rather serious situation. In the first months of 2003 there were a series of minor outbreaks of violence culminating with another major conflict in Langtang in March. In June, the well publicised murder of Muslim travellers passing through Langtang lorry-park has reminded the indigenous populations that the conflict is alive. A visit to Langtang towards the end of June was marked by unnaturally quiet roads and a collapse of commerce and services such as water and electricity. Roads in this region of Plateau State have become effectively divided between Muslim and Christian blocks. Pastoralists who are usually grazing the fresh grass at this season were conspicuous by their absence.

The whole report is here (pdf). Check out Jeremy’s post.

Nneoma of Pyoowata writes in a review of Nigerian bloggers’ response to ‘District 9′ for NigeriansTalk.org:

In an interview with the Huffington Post, Neill Blomkamp states that the small population of Nigerians in South Africa is indeed responsible for the majority of crime in his country. In keeping with his bias against Nigerians, District 9 features prominently, a Nigerian criminal gang that engages in dubious business deals and pimps out its women to this largely male alien species. Nigerians are also the center of the films occultic elements, unrelated to Nigerian traditional religion and medicine (despite ill-informed documentaries citing otherwise). In purporting District 9 to be a social commentary against xenophobic hatred and then opening the movie with lurid Nigerian characters, ??contradict[s] himself as soon as he started writing the script,? according to blogger MellowYel of Stuff Nigerians Love/Hate. Nigerian American science fiction author, Nnedi, also vents her frustration with the film on her blog and makes the point that beyond this, black South Africans served as a ?mere setting,? for the film. Sugabelly, known for her biting frankness, goes on to suggest that ??if you squinted your eyes just a little bit you might not even notice the movie was set in Africa.? District 9 was hardly a triumph for African film industry and definitely was not worth disparaging Nigerians in South Africa.

A comment on the same movie by a reader of New York Press (HT Sean):

?As a young Afrikaans South African with a fondness for interspecies-conflict-based fiction, I enjoyed D9, and still I agree with [Armond] White [New York Press film critic] on a few levels. As a purely fictional sci-fi movie, D9 is excellent. During the first 15 minutes of the movie, the entire audience around me was laughing at how the South-African public?s nuances were portrayed? But White is right about the whole analogy thing. The similarities between Apartheid and Human- Prawn segregation is non-existent, except for the fact that in both cases the segregated party resided in crappy shacks.There is a lot more to South Africa?s history than what the general international public realizes, and Peter Jackson?s cash-in on it seems like pure publicity hunting to me.What?s worse to me is the hundreds of critics appraising the analogy in D9, while they themselves don?t know shit about what apartheid is really about. The Nigerian thing is also way overdone, and I feel it is insensitive seeing that there is already a general xenophobia in SA toward Nigerians.?

From my column of this Tuesday:

I have not yet seen the movie but from what I have read from reviews, the movie seems to have borrowed the worst from Nollywood movies. I consider tapping into an existing body of work fair game, but I think that taking snatches and omitting the context is an extreme form of laziness. But then, when one thinks about it, was this kind of misrepresentation not something waiting to happen?

I would like to see a level of outcry similar to the one that has followed the movie directed towards Nollywood movies that portray Nigerians as people who make money from human body parts. Or is that belief so entrenched in the minds of Nigerians that it cannot be questioned? On the part of Nollywood producers, I hope that this makes them realise that they are making movies for the whole of Africa. Indeed, many Africans think that ritual killing, along with some form of cannibalism, is prevalent in Nigeria.

I find the references to Nigeria and the depiction of Nigerians in the movie highly distasteful, in case you are curious.

And from CNN:

Some Nigerians said the movie feeds off stereotypes associated with the country.

“Everyone has this image of Nigeria,” Umeano said. “A lot of people have given Nigeria a bad name, but that does not mean the whole country is bad.”

While Clement Nyirenda believes the director should have used a fictional country, he said the outcry is much ado about nothing.

After all, he said, the Nigerian movie industry, Nollywood, is filled with the same characterizations.

“The (Nollywood) movies show Nigerians as witch doctors, corrupt, a lot worse,” Nyirenda said. “Nigeria is mostly known for 419 scams … the government officials should focus on cleaning the image.”

The term “419 scams” refers to spam e-mails that ask for money and bank information.

Akunyili said the country is trying to “rebrand itself away from such images.” The Nollywood industry is undergoing a makeover, too, she added.

was published a couple of weeks ago. It is here, but I have pasted the full text below.

Thinking through kids
Olumide Abimbola

Act One
A couple of days ago I joined one of my friends to pick up his daughter at the kindergarten. This was the first time I was seeing her in close to two years; the last time I saw and carried her she was just about 4 months old. Of course, she didn’t remember me, so I had to find a way to charm myself into her favour. The first steps involved me smiling sheepishly, talking gently and offering my arms to her. She refused all the advances, despite the very hearty encouragement from her father.

We left the kindergarten and headed for a café, where my friend pulled out a lunch box filled with grapes. It was obviously something she loves very much. Still trying to get her attention, I took one of the grapes and offered it to her. She, as I suspected, refused. But then, something else happened that got me thinking about reciprocity and economic exchange. As I was trying to ingratiate myself in her favour without much success, her father gave her a grape to give to me. She collected the grape and passed it on. Then he gave me a grape to offer her; this time, she accepted it. From then on things went pretty smoothly.

What I took away from this has nothing to do with trust and child psychology, at least not directly. I realized that I just witnessed, from a child, one of the most cardinal things in human economic relations: reciprocity. At that moment, with that little girl, I realized that I was witnessing the early traces of that social characteristic of the human. I could not help but wonder – and this is the part where I need the help of child psychologists – when kids start putting a value to things, what values mean to them and how they relate to values.

Act Two
Another friend’s daughter made her parents promise to get her a Spider-man cake for her third birthday. But all these were to change just shortly before the birthday. Sometime between the day she elicited the promise from her parents and shortly before her birthday she changed her mind. She had just joined a kindergarten, where she learnt about the differences between what a boy should want and what a girl should want.

She learnt that she liked pink – something she did not know until she joined the kindergarten. She also found out that she wanted to be a princess. Her mother started getting requests concerning pink dresses for princesses. Boys were supposed to be knights. In fact, one of her male friends was waving a sword, slicing the air, when I met him. Of course, her relationship with Spider-man changed; she wanted a princess cake instead. She had learnt that Spider-man is for boys and princess for girls.

This got me thinking about how children are socialised by each other. Someone mentioned to me that children are very serious conformists, and that kids always strive to be like their mates, never wanting to unduly stand out. How many kids have quickly forgotten languages they acquired while living abroad because they are afraid that their mates would make fun of their difference? How many kids have joined in making fun of other kids who look like they might not ‘belong’? Of course, prejudices that kids display are picked from adults; and it is presumable that the children who are the first to bring the idea of gender roles and differences into the kindergarten somehow got it from adults.

It is interesting to watch kids learn from their parents and from each other. But perhaps the most important thing is what one learns from watching them learn: the importance of socialisation, and of being social.

Yesterday afternoon I ran into part of the Nigerian team to the IAAF World Championship in Athletics in Berlin. It was at a Nigerian restaurant. From the way they interacted with the staff, and from references to previous days, it seemed that they had been going there everyday since they got to Berlin. This got me wondering how adventourous we are with regards to food. These are Nigerians who’ve travelled to Europe (they probably don’t travel to Europe very often) and who have sought out one of the very few places where one can get Nigerian food in Berlin. Actually, it is the only decent one I know.

While we are on foods, I might raise the point that has bugged me for quite a while. Why is it that African food has not become popular in Europe? Why is it that African restaurants only cater to a very small clientele, namely Africans living in Europe, and Africans who visit Europe (like the Nigerian team above)? I have not fully thought it through, which is why I was excited to see this blog post. It answers it to a certain extent but I think the topic could do with a lot more exploration, at least as it concerns Europe. Also see this article about good-looking food.